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Who Commits a Crime? Who is Responsible? 
Do we have any responsibility when we do not try to stop some-
one from committing a crime? 
HASEGAWA Miyuki
Abstract: The other day, on TV, a woman who lives in the same community with the 
boy who died from child abuse said, ‘The boy could have been saved. We are all re-
sponsible for his death’. It is this kind of responsibility which this paper will discuss.
Key words: responsibility, self, intention, reintegrative shaming.
Introduction
　The aim of this paper is to show that the notion of individual responsibility, which is 
the principle of the modern law, should be expanded beyond the narrow boundary of 
individuality. An individual is responsible for his own acts, not for others’ acts. This is 
the principle of the modern law which is based on the rational self. This paper argues 
that such an individual is the ideal and the ideological human model of the modern law, 
and in order not to be irresponsible and apathetic towards others and society, we need 
to expand the notion of individual responsibility.
　In order to examine whether the above contention is a sound argument, first of all, 
this paper explores the relationship between the self and the concept of responsibility, 
and shows that the way of understanding the self is central for responsibility. To eluci-
date the argument, this paper compares views of the self in the modern law model (the 
modern self) with the self in the non-modern law model (the non-modern self). It is 
therefore useful to adopt the concept of the self which Japanese legal practices tacitly 
presuppose (the non-modern self) as a contrasting model in comparison with that in the 
modern law model in order to extract the differences of how responsibility is attributed. 
　Secondly, this paper deals with intention. We normally think that intention is some 
distinct mental state or process to which only the agent has direct access, and therefore 
should be discerned by asking the agent. This paper argues that such understanding is 
based on the modern self, and by introducing a different understanding of intention the 
concept of responsibility should be changed. When a socially evil act has been commit-
ted, we generally attribute responsibility to the actor’s intention. The actor is responsi-
ble because she1 dared (intended) to commit the act even though she could have done 
something different. What then is intention? This paper explores what consequence is 
brought about when we attribute responsibility to one’s intention solely.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
1 Hereafter, this paper uses ‘she’ embracing both genders. The same works for her and herself.
244
Studies on Humanities and Social Sciences of Chiba University vol.17
　Thirdly, this paper examines ‘reintegrative shaming’ introduced by John Braithwaite 
in Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989). Braithwaite states, ‘Crime is best controlled 
when members of the community are the primary controllers through active participa-
tion in shaming offenders, and, having shamed them, through concerted participation in 
ways of reintegrating the offender back into the community of law abiding citizens.’ 2 In 
his book we can see the power of shaming as an informal social control, and Braith-
waite’s criticism of extreme individualism and individual responsibility. A person com-
mits a crime. She is responsible for what she has done, so she has to take responsibility. 
However is it only she who is responsible for all the outcomes? Are those who are re-
lated to her and the communities she belongs to responsible as well? Do we have a re-
sponsibility to shame her in order to reintegrate her back into the community? This pa-
per examines whether reintegrative shaming means the expansion of responsibility.
1　The Relationship between the Self and the Concept of Responsibility 
　In the modern law model, when a certain act is done by a person, her intention is the 
only account for her responsibility, thus this responsibility does not trace back any fur-
ther in time sequence. When a person does something wrong, she must not excuse her-
self for her wrong act on the grounds of her genes, miserable past life, environment, in-
fluence from others or any other circumstantial reasons. Her intention, that is, that she 
decided to do a certain act based on her firm intention, not controlled by anything else 
except her decision, is the only cause of her (wrong) act. However, in the Japanese way 
of thinking, when a certain act is taken into consideration, it includes not only that par-
ticular act, but something which is wider in space and time. For example, when a cer-
tain act is done by a person, the attribution of her act does not stop at her intention, 
but it goes further to past life, environment or influences from others. In other words, 
she could attribute her act to a variety of historical, social, hereditary, environmental, 
and situational factors. Her intention is only one of many attributions to which her re-
sponsibility may be attached. The following chart illustrates these arguments.
　In the modern law model, responsibility is attributed to intention for a particular act. 
A person feels responsibility because it was she who decided to act and actually acted. 
It was not the environment or situation surrounding her that made her decide and act, 
but it was her intention to do a certain act. However, in the Japanese model, responsi-
bility is attributed to the whole range of her life experience which causes her to decide 
and act. A person feels responsibility for the whole range of factors above including her 
intention.
　Thus, it is sometimes said that the Japanese sense of responsibility is diffuse, weak 
and vague. It is diffuse in the sense that, for example, a senior class executive has to 
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
2 John Braithwaite, Crime Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 8.
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take responsibility and resign her position when one of her staff did something against 
the company. This has to be so even though the executive is not the direct supervisor. 
You may think that this is a very strong responsibility; however, it is diffuse because 
the range of her responsibility is beyond her own intention and control. It is weak, for 
example, that one’s own responsibility is dispersed among the members of a group. As 
a result in the worst case, no one is seriously taking responsibility.
　Equally, blame is attributed to one’s intention in a particular time and space in the 
modern law model. Thus, the society blames her very intention and not her circum-
stances. However, in the Japanese model, the society should take all of her life history 
into consideration to determine how much she is responsible. In other words, her inten-
tion does not play a major role when deciding her blameworthiness to a particular act.
　Here are the summary of the self in the Modern Law Model and the Japanese Model.
Model１
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Notes: Are the Self in the Modern Law Model and the Self in the Japanese Model the 
Same?
　Are we talking about and comparing the same notion of ‘the self’? The modern self is 
conscious and rational. The self in the Japanese model, on the other hand, is the concep-
tually wider self that includes not only the conscious and rational self but also the un-
conscious self. In the modern law model, when referring to the self, it generally means 
the ideologically conscious self which is segregated from body and emotions. However, 
in the Japanese model, the self includes the body and emotions in wider space and time. 
When seeing the self as in the Japanese model, the blame and responsibility are to be 
attributed not only to the conscious and rational self, but also to the entire being.
2　Responsibility Based on Individual Intention
　According to the modern law model, one’s intention is the fundamental single agent 
to which responsibility should be ascribed. On the other hand, in the Japanese model, 
one’s intention is not as distinct as in the modern law model, and seems embedded in 
many other factors, therefore it looks ambiguous. In the modern law model, intention 
seems some distinct mental state or process, and should be discerned by asking an 
agent. This section argues whether one’s intention is a distinct hidden metal state as 
the modern law maintains, and what consequence is brought about when we attribute 
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responsibility solely to one’s intention. 
2.1　Intention is Not a Mental State, Different from Thinking
　Intention is normally understood as a mental state such as thought, idea, motive, de-
sire, lust or decision. 
　Example 13
It has started raining. I can see a taxi coming behind me. I have raised my right 
hand. The taxi has stopped beside me.
In this case, my right hand did not rise automatically. Because I had an ‘intention’ 
to raise my right hand, my hand was raised.
Intention is not the process of thinking ‘I am going to raise my right hand’ before 
raising my right hand. I might have thought that I wanted to stop a taxi, but I do 
not remember to have thought to raise my right hand. I only remember that I 
thought, ‘Oh, no. Now it is raining. What good timing. I can see a taxi coming’. I also 
remember that I thought, ‘I shouldn’t really take a taxi because it is too expensive’, 
but a little later I thought, ‘Who cares? It is raining’. But I do not remember wheth-
er I thought I was going to raise my right hand or not. Then, was my right hand 
raised automatically? No. I definitely raised my hand and nobody else helped me do 
it. It is no doubt that my intention to raise my right hand caused me to raise my 
right hand. So, intention is different from thinking.
　Having a certain intention is different from thinking.4 Whatever a person thinks of do-
ing A, it does not mean that he has an intention of doing A. It is merely a thought or 
idea. When you think of trying to stand up from the chair, this thinking itself does not 
cause you to stand up.5 When you actually stood up from the chair, you did something 
different from just thinking of standing up.6 It is intention. Intention is not some sort of 
mental or psychological state.7
　Antony Duff quotes the following example from Lord Asquith saying that ‘intention is 
something quite distinct from motive or desire’.
A man who boards a plane which he knows is bound for Manchester clearly in-
tends to travel to Manchester, even thought Manchester is the last place he wants 
to be and his motive for boarding the plane is simply to escape pursuit…. By board-
ing the Manchester plane, the man conclusively demonstrates his intention to go 
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
3 Yoshimichi Nakajima, Tetsugaku no Kyoukasho (The Text of Philosophy) (Koudan Sha, Tokyo, 
1995), p. 168.
4 Id.
5 Ibid, p. 169.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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there, because it is a moral certainty that that is where he will arrive.8
　In the above case, if his intention is understood as his motive or desire, his intention 
may be his wanting to escape. Since he knows, however, that the plane is bound for 
Manchester, and he actually boards the Manchester plane, his intention is thus to be 
concluded that he intends to go to Manchester. According to Duff, we do not refer to 
his inner mental state to discover his intention. If intention is a hidden mental state pri-
or to action to which only the agent has direct access, how should we distinguish inten-
tion from merely thought or desire? We think of and want to do many things in every-
day life. While we sometimes take actions based on those thoughts, we sometimes only 
think and do not make any further actions. In these ordinary everyday practices, we as-
cribe causes or responsibilities to intentions for some actions or consequences of actions, 
not to merely thoughts. If we ascribe cause or responsibility not to merely thinking but 
to intention, it means that we are treating intention quite differently from thinking. If I 
want to save a drowning person, what distinguishes my intention to save her from just 
a thought or desire? This is what this paper will argue in the next section – connection 
to hehaviour.
2.2　Intention is Connected to an Observable Behaviour
　Nakajima asserts that intention could be recognized as the capacity of causing an 
act.9 It is not a silent shout in one’s heart.10
　Example 211
When a person sees a child drowning in the river, wants to save the child, and he 
is shouting ‘I must save him!’ in his heart, it is not certain, even to himself, whether 
he has the intention of saving the child, or it could be just a hope until he actually 
jumps into the river and tries to save the child. No matter how he hopes or wishes 
in his heart, it could not be admitted as intention unless his hope causes a concrete 
act as a result. However, even if he jumps into the river without awareness, comes 
back with the child in his arms, and says, ‘I do not remember what I just did’, his 
very act of having saved the child is recognized as being the result of an intention 
to save the child.
　As was shown above, intention is connected to an observable external form of an act 
rather than inner metal processes.12
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
8 Antony Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law 
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990), p. 21
9 Nakajima, op. cit., p. 170. He also states that intention is emerging when understood as a cause of 
bringing about an act.
10 Id.
11 Arranged from Nakajima, ibid, pp. 170-171.
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　Duff also indicates that intention cannot be identified independently of behaviour.
… we cannot separate intention from behaviour as the dualist does; … we can iden-
tify our own or other people’s intentions only in and through the actions which we 
or they intend to do.13
　The following point should be noted. First, that ‘intention could be recognized as the 
capacity of causing an act’ and that ‘intention is causing an act’ are conceptually differ-
ent. The latter implies that if there is an intention, then there is an act caused by that 
intention, and describes the relation of these, such as ‘A causes B’. The former asserts 
that intention could only be recognized through tracing back from the related act, un-
derstood as ‘because of B, A can be recognized’. The following chart illustrates two dif-
ferences.
　Chart 1
　As was mentioned above, first there is an act or a consequence of an act, and inten-
tion can emerge in the stage when searching for the cause which brought it about. In 
such, intention can be understood as if it were a mental process; however, it is not an 
agent’s mental state and it gains meaning by being traced back from the observable be-
haviour. Intention does not emerge without observable behaviour.
2.3　Unconsciousness of Intention
　It is not necessary to be aware of, or to be conscience of one’s intention during an act.
　Example 314
Now, you are sitting, not standing. It means that you have an intention of remain-
ing seated unless you stand up. Otherwise, you have to admit that you are sitting 
without the intention of sitting.
　As was shown above, people need not to be aware of their intentions during some 
acts at all times. People can do things without knowing their intentions. When a person 
is walking, she does not need to be conscious of the fact that she is walking or she has 
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
12 Ibid., p. 171.
13 Duff, op. cit., p. 128.
14 Arranged from Nakajima, ibid, pp. 169~170.
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an intention of walking. The person who saw a child drowning in the river in the exam-
ple 2, jumped into the river and saved the child may say ‘I do not remember what I did 
at all’. Even thought he was not aware of his intention, his intention can be recognized 
as ‘he had an intention to save the child’.
2.4　Intention Can be Understood in a Social Context
　Following from the above discussions, it is now understood that intention is not a 
mental or psychological state, intention is connected to an observable behaviour, and in-
tention is not always conscious but also can be unconscious. Then, as long as a person 
analyzes her behaviour, is she able to know her intention only by herself? The answer 
is no. Knowing or finding out an intention is not that easy, because intention is not 
something that can emerge when one asks oneself. 15
One’s intention is not determined by oneself. It gains meaning socially by adding 
various elements through cooperating with possible other(s).16
… intentions cannot be identified as intentions (as distinct, for example, from idle 
thoughts about an action) except by reference to the actual behaviour which is in-
tended.17
　Intention can be understood in a social context. ‘Possible others’ in the quotation 
above mean not only practical and realistic others who can answer ‘you were intending 
so and so’ when asked ‘what was I intending to do?’ or ‘what did I want to do just 
now?’, but also mean others including oneself and society whom you can communicate 
with when asking the above questions.
　Without the people and society who understand and interpret one’s behaviour, one’s 
intention does not emerge. In other words, one’s intention can be determined through 
social context besides one’s thought or desire. Nakajima cited the following case as an 
example of one’s intention not always being determined by one’s memory and mental 
state.
An 18 year old boy strangled his girlfriend many times, and consequently she died 
as a result. Regarding the act of strangling, the prosecutor and his defense were in 
accord, however, while the prosecutor maintained consistently that ‘he had an in-
tention to kill the girl’, his defense asserted that ‘he had an intention to strangle 
her, but he did not have an intention to kill’….
His mental state which he remembers is most unreliable. Even though he remem-
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
15 Ibid., p. 173.
16 Id.
17 Duff, op. cit., p..128.
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bers clearly that he did not dare to kill her, it does not mean that he did not have 
an intention to kill. The issue here is whether it is plausible to say that he intended 
to kill her. Even if he did not have any slightest idea of killing her, his behaviour 
strangling her many times is to be determined as he had an intention to kill. His in-
tention to kill is thus determined from his behaviour besides his mental state or 
psychological state.18
　Whatever an actor says, his very behaviour indicates what his intention was. No mat-
ter how strongly the boy insisted that he did not intend to kill her, his intention is de-
termined by his behavioural aspect. There is no entirely personally subjective and hid-
den intention. Duff asserts similar arguments.
… if we know that a person waited on a bridge with a block of concrete, and 
pushed it off the bridge when he saw a car about to pass underneath, we could ask 
‘what else could a person who pushed such objects have intended but to cause re-
ally serious bodily harm to the occupants of the car? (Hancock and Shankland, p. 
469)….19
… intention is logically parasitic on action; it is necessarily directed towards action, 
and can be understood only in terms of its relation to action.20
… no particular thought (or feeling or other mental occurrence) can amount to an 
intention in or by itself: …21
　According to Duff, intention and action can not be separated, and intention is to be 
discerned within the pattern of actions and their relating to the social context.22 We do 
not observe an action as a single agent independently of the social context. ‘Particular 
acts (raising my arm) have their character and meaning as actions only in virtue of 
their role within a wider structure of action and context (signaling to turn left or wav-
ing to a friend)’.23
When I read a philosophical book, what I see are not mere marks on paper, but 
words and sentences. In working out the book’s meaning, I am not trying to make 
inferences from what I read to some separate realm of meaning: I am trying to 
identify the pattern and direction of thought which can be discerned in the book, 
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
18 Nakajima, op. cit., p. 172.
19 Duff, op. cit., p. 133.
20 Id.
21 Ibid, p. 134.
22 Ibid, p. 132.
23 Ibid, p. 134.
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given the wider context of thought in which it is set; and my account of its mean-
ing will show how its parts are related to each other and to that wider context. So 
too, in trying to understand a person’s actions (what he is doing and why), I am try-
ing to see what they mean; to discern the pattern of which they are part, their rela-
tion to their context, and the direction in which they are moving.24
　Following from the above, if intention gains meaning through social context, we may 
be mistaken when discerning one’s intention. Going back to the previous example 1 , 
raising her right hand may mean something different in a different context, such as she 
is waving her friends. Duff also indicates mistakes or uncertainties when observing peo-
ple’s behaviours.
When there is room for doubt about what an agent intends, we may have to infer 
his intentions from the available evidence – from ‘what he did, what he said, and all 
the circumstances of the case’; and our inferences may be mistaken. But such infer-
ences are neither from colourless bodily movements, nor to the contents of a hid-
den mental realm to which only the agent has direct access: they are from the ac-
tions, or aspects of actions, which we observe, to the broader patterns of meaning 
of which they are part.25
To discern an agent’s intentions is to grasp the relation between her action and its 
context (including what else she does); ….26
It is concluded that intention is not identified independently of actions and their re-
lating to the social context.
2.5　Intention as a Cause
　When do we yearn to pursue the cause most? It is when the worst incident has hap-
pened, and the more tragic and heart-breaking the incident was, the more strongly we 
yearn to know what caused that tragedy. It is also natural that we want to find out the 
cause when everything went all right; however, when things did not turn out well, and 
when some event deviates from what we would normally expect27, our desire to seek 
the cause would be stronger. For example, we normally want to know the cause of an 
airplane crash rather than the cause of the safe airplane landing, we normally want to 
know the reason why X committed suicide rather than the reason why X is living nor-
mally.28 Through such a process of seeking the cause, intention may emerge.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
24 Duff, ibid, p. 132.
25 Ibid, p. 131.
26 Id.
27 Nakajima, op. cit., p. 163.
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　If we ascribe the cause of one’s action to one’s intention as one’s inner mental state, 
the causal relationship from one’s intention to one’s action (such as inferences from ef-
fect to cause) would seem obvious, and searching for the cause would end at one’s in-
tention. Therefore, following from the above logic, it would seem plausible to ascribe re-
sponsibility solely to one’s intention. On the other hand, however, if we ascribe the 
cause of one’s action to a variety of factors, such as disposition, environment, emotions, 
influences from others or any other circumstantial reasons, it would seem difficult to de-
termine what exactly causes the action.
　When the attribution of the blame or responsibility stops at one’s intention, it can be 
easy to say who is responsible. We don’t have to consider personal history or disposi-
tion, how a person has been influenced by whom, her self including her unconscious 
state, and so on. It is her intention which should be blamed.
　However, to think that the responsibility of one’s act should be only attributed to her 
intention could be a pious deception to ignore other responsibilities, such as other peo-
ple, society and circumstances surrounding her. This structure, that is, to attribute 
enormous responsibility to the individual could make an irresponsible society as a re-
sult. When we say that it is A’s responsibility, it automatically implies that others 
should not be responsible or blamed. It can be said that to exempt others from taking 
any responsibility, the notion of individual responsibility was created.
3　Is Reintegrative Shaming the Expansion of Responsibility? And Conclusions
　This section does not go details of the theory of reintegrative shaming. It focuses on 
whether ‘reintegrative shaming’ is the expansion of responsibility.
　‘We have a responsibility to shame a criminal and to reintegrate her back into the 
community’. If this is what reintegrative shaming aims at, then it can be concluded that 
reintegrative shaming means responsibility expansion besides the formal criminal re-
sponsibility. However, there is a difference between the above and the argument of this 
paper.
・To shame (blame) someone who is doing or did shameful acts,
・To blame someone or to attribute responsibility to someone who could prevent (or 
could have prevented) the actor from committing a crime but who is not doing or did 
not do shameful acts.
　The former is Braithwaite’ argument and the latter is the argument of this paper. 
When facing some criminal act, to think ‘you could have done something, I could have 
done something to prevent it, that is why you and I are in some ways responsible for it’ 
is the issue of this research, and it is different from Braithwaite’s.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
28 Id.
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　However, those two are closely related. If we do the former shaming, but there is no 
mutual trust, interdependency, or respectful significant others in a society, shaming is 
meaningless. Only when there are significant others and respectful social bonds in a so-
ciety, shaming is effective. And, in such a society, we can not agree with the idea of the 
individual responsibility.
　If there are evil acts, shameful acts or harms in the community, I feel that I am re-
sponsible for those acts and harms, because I feel that I could have done something to 
them even though I actually could not have prevented the acts and the harms. 29
（Graduate Student, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences）
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